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Leonid E. Grinin 
National Research University Higher School of  
Economics, Moscow; Institute for Oriental Studies of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow 
ABSTRACT 
Although there occurred numerous revolutions in the ancient world and  
in the Middle Ages, their historical role was relatively small. Starting from 
the Modern period, the role of revolutions as historical engines increased 
dramatically, which was connected with the started industrial era and emerg-
ing technologies, with development of capitalist relations, to which the revo-
lutions opened the way in the struggle against absolutism and obsolete social 
relations. The article considers the role of revolutions in the long-term histor-
ical process and the World-System's development as well as analyzes the 
changing importance of revolutions from ancient times to the present day. 
The author shows why the nature of revolutions has changed and their signif-
icance has sharply increased since the beginning of the sixteenth century, that 
is with the started Early Modern period and the Industrial revolution. The 
author also explains how and why the role of revolutions as the most im-
portant driving force of historical process and progress started to decline 
against the background of the increasing role of more legitimate and less 
expensive forms of societal transformations. The contemporary role of revo-
lutions and their usage as a geopolitical weapon are also examined. The au-
thor also defines the correlation between developing technologies, globaliza-
tion, and the role of revolution in historical process. While considering these 
aspects he also addresses some points related to the theory of revolution and 
makes some predictions regarding the future role of revolutions for the devel-
opment of societies and the World-System in general. 
ON ANCIENT AND CONTEMPORARY REVOLUTIONS 
In the political history of complex human societies, revolutions have been 
observed for many centuries. But only starting from the early modern 
period have revolutions become one of the major driving forces of histor-
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ical progress, leading to novel regime types and reshaping international 
power relations. 
Revolutions can be (and should be) considered within several ap-
proaches: 
1) Within the systemic approach revolutions are considered as a seri-
ous imbalance which may emerge when a system shifts from a relatively 
stable state into unstable due to huge disproportions in societal develop-
ment. The system enters the crisis period while revolutions turn one of the 
forms of crisis resolution. This approach is most frequently applied.1 
2) Within the sociological approach revolutions are seldom consid-
ered as historical phenomena while the major focus is put on their recur-
rent features. This approach is also widely employed. 
However, revolutions can hardly be treated only within the frameworks 
of systemic or sociological approaches when a society is considered mostly 
as a self-sufficient system. One should consider it within a wider context. 
And for this purpose we may use the following approaches. 
3) The World-System approach considers revolutions at the back-
ground of the World-System changes as well as the impact of the World-
System changes on revolutions and vice versa the impact of revolutions on 
transformations and reconfigurations of the World System. 
4) The world-historical approach treats revolutions as phenomena whose 
role as an instrument of progress considerably changes in the course of un-
folding historical process. 
Unfortunately, the investigators less frequently apply the last two ap-
proaches. So in the present article we will pay particular attention to them. 
It is also obvious that the defined approaches can be combined. 
5) It is also worth analyzing revolutions with respect to other societal 
changes, in particular, those leading to similar results. However, only a few 
investigators of revolutions systemically consider the place of revolutions 
among other forms of transformation of a society and means of resolution 
of social and political contradictions especially within the historical process 
frames. Among those who performed it with unfailing systematically one 
can name Shmuel Eisenstadt and also to a certain extent, Samuel Hunting-
ton, Jack Goldstone, and Charles Tilly (Eisenstadt 1978; Huntington 1968, 
1991, 1996; Goldstone 1991; Tilly 1992). In the present article we will also 
discuss why and how the role of revolutions in historical process change in 
comparison with other protest forms and social conflicts and processes 
changing a society and its development. 
Here we analyze the transformations of revolutions within historical 
and globalization processes and in connection with the World-System's trans-
formations. In the last section we show the correlation between development 
of technologies, globalization, and the role of revolution in historical process. 
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In conclusion we also offer some forecasts regarding the future role of revolu-
tions in the development of societies and the World System in general. 
It is sometimes argued that there had occurred no revolutions prior  
to the Modern era (e.g., Ellul 1971), but of course, it is far from true. If one 
considers revolutions as a violent change of regime, he may say that they 
have accompanied political history for many millennia. But such revolutions 
were mainly characteristic for the polis-type states whose regimes could 
alternate from oligarchic (or tyrannical) to democratic and vice versa. Thus, 
prior to the early modern period the revolutions mostly occurred in the states 
whose political regimes were less widespread during the pre-industrial peri-
od. In a revolutionary perspective the history of some Hellenistic states and 
Rome may be also presented as a struggle between social and political 
groups for the distribution of resources and power (see, e.g., Sorokin 1992, 
1994; Hansen 1989; Cartledge 1998; Grinin 2004). We may define some 
phenomena resembling political and social revolutions in the medieval states 
(in Italy and some other countries). Social struggle is also observed in the 
history of some Eastern states. But these attempts to establish a new regime 
and, figuratively speaking, change ‘constitution’, were quite rare; yet, some-
times one observes a kind of social revolution when socio-economic (dis-
tributive) relations are changed.2 However, there did occur devastating upris-
ings, sometimes sweeping away the dynasties, as it happened in China.3 
However, despite the abovementioned examples, in ancient times and 
medieval period there were no revolutions that could promote a societal 
advance to a higher stage of social evolution. No doubt, revolutions used 
to be a developmental factor but obviously less important than wars and 
other transformations. The societies' productive basis would remain the 
same after revolutions, thus, the progressive effect of the latter was much 
weaker than in the Modern era.  
Only starting from the Modern period the revolutions became one of 
the leading driving forces of historical process (see Grinin 1997; Semyonov 
et al. 2007; Travin and Morgania 2004; Goldstone 2014). Why did it hap-
pen? The reason is the transition to a new – industrial – production principle 
which started in the late fifteenth century (for more details see Grinin 2006; 
Grinin L. and Grinin A. 2015; Grinin, Korotayev 2015; see the Table be-
low) for the correlation between the stages of technological development 
and the role of revolution). Along with a breakthrough in production  
it was necessary to transform all other relations, so that a society could cre-
ate abundant space for the development of new productive forces. Mean-
while, revolutions could help eliminate the relations hampering that devel-
opment. Thus, we mostly speak about revolutions of a new type, which 
were practically unknown in the history prior to the sixteenth century. We 
describe them as a phenomenon that turned extremely important for the 
unfolding historical process and as a means of realizing the society's pro-
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gressive development, raising its economic, cultural, political, and legal 
level.4 In other words, here we treat revolutions not just as a means  
to change political regime or as a way of conflict resolution in societies but 
as a transformation which eventually took a temporal lead in terms of tech-
nological, cultural and political development and which would drive ahead 
not only a certain society but the whole World System.5  
Starting from the Modern era one can speak about a peculiar role  
of revolutions in the development of historical process, the role of ‘a locomo-
tive of history’ (according to Marx 1964); yet, as we will show, this role start-
ed to decline and change already in the mid-nineteenth century. For Shmuel 
Eisenstadt (1978) the revolutions of the early Modern era are modern revolu-
tions. However, he notes that many scholars ignore the relation between revo-
lution and modernity. And those who acknowledge that the main structural 
and institutional features of revolutions are inherent to the Modern era still 
fail to trace the relation between these features and fundamental characteris-
tics of modernity. Samuel Huntington also argues that revolutions can hardly 
outbreak in traditional societies with a low level of social and economic com-
plexity. It is a phenomenon of a modernizing society (Huntington 1968). 
Finally, we should note that the increasing role of revolutions in histori-
cal process was associated not only with general technological transfor-
mations clearly manifested from the last third of the fifteenth century (see 
Grinin 2006; Grinin L. and Grinin A. 2015; Grinin and Korotayev 2015), but 
also with the concurrent breakthrough in information technologies. Any great 
revolution or a new wave of revolutions is somehow connected with emerg-
ing principally new media or with their improvement. In what follows (in the 
second section), we try to trace this trajectory of revolutionary practices. 
Before proceeding to the next section we would like to make one more 
remark. Although the starting point of globalization has been long debated 
(see Grinin 2011b; Grinin and Korotayev 2014, 2018) still nobody denies 
that the beginning of the Age of Discovery (between the late fifteenth and 
early sixteenth centuries) was a landmark for the history of globalization. 
However, it is not coincidence that almost at the same period the history of 
modern revolutions also starts. We mean the start of the Reformation in 
Germany and its 500th anniversary was marked in 2017. Just from this time 
one can mark off modern revolutions in Europe and in the world (about the 
Reformation in Germany as the first revolution, the Reformation in Europe 
and the first waves of revolutions as well as about differences between rev-
olutions of the modern period and earlier ones; see also Grinin 2017b). 
THE ROLE OF REVOLUTIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
SOCIAL SYSTEM AND WORLD SYSTEM 
Revolutions as a means to change a society's social-political structure 
under the conditions of capitalist and industrial production 
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As we mentioned, although the history of some ancient and medieval socie-
ties can be described in revolutionary terms as a struggle between social 
and political groups, it is only after the coming of the Modern era that 
revolutions became one of the leading driving force of historical process. 
And as already pointed, this happened mostly because the European coun-
tries entered a new – industrial – production principle (see Grinin L. and 
Grinin A. 2015, 2016b) which provoked the necessity to transform other 
societal sub-systems. This process is generally also connected with the 
early type of modernization.8  
Thus, revolutions are the result of transition of societies and in general, 
of historical development to the path of a consistent economic growth and 
respective changes in relations and institutions. Therefore, revolutions ap-
pear to be a search for the ways to provide societies' continuous develop-
ment while a society is yet unaware that a constant growth is not occasional 
and abnormal but a necessary prerequisite for the existence of modern so-
ciety. Revolution is one of the means to provide broad expense for constant 
change in society and for its existence under these changes. 
As a result, the criteria of successful societies within historical process 
started to change. If to follow the common developmental logic of historical 
process, at its origin one may trace a search for opportunities to transform 
local relatively small societies/polities into larger entities: states and later em-
pires. To create sustainable political entities there were needed powerful and 
stable institutions which were to be gradually established. We also observe  
a number of centralization/decentralization cycles combined with the search 
for mechanisms and institutions to consolidate societies (Frank and Gills 
1993; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Chase-Dunn et al. 2010; Grinin 2008, 
2011a). 
In Europe these institutions developed into legitimate and sacralized 
monarchy (which needed much time to create the rules of inheritance), 
national states, social class or other forms of structured social order (Grin-
in 2008, 2012a). Thus, historical process ‘operated’ in order to establish 
strong institutions that could maintain social stability under any perturba-
tions along with states’ constant external activity. This was also supported 
by quite conservative, archaic and far from constantly changing industrial 
and technological (as well as social) foundations of society (since the 
peasantry constituted the major part of population and the cultural level 
remained archaic with low literacy level). But with the change of produc-
tive and technological basis, the strong and sometimes too strong societal 
bonds (e.g., a particular dynasty's imperial power used to be the most im-
portant bond for a multinational state) would gradually turn an obstacle 
for the advance in a society which at that point considered industry and 
trade as the most important means to solve financial and other problems 
and that had both to endure and develop them under conditions of interna-
tional rivalry as well as to take care of the means of communication, edu-
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cation, etc. Hence, the major and most important achievements in historical 
progress (a well-organized autocracy, an absolute monarchy and strong 
state-controlled estates, a clear social hierarchy, totalitarian religion and 
others) suddenly started to hamper development and progress, the idea  
of which began to form and strengthen. At the same time, liberalization 
and humanization of relations took place – from absolute monarchy  
to absolute enlightened monarchy. These humanized relations prevented 
repressiveness and became an important factor for activating revolutions 
(see below). 
Thus, the former institutions, including absolute monarchy and in many 
respects the self-sustainable aristocracy (along with the church and estate 
structure which became state-sanctioned) became a brake for progress 
since the model of existence and functioning had changed from a con-
servative to a dynamic one. And as it has already been mentioned, since 
those were very strong and powerful institutions and there were no other 
tools to affect them (and no suitable historical experience) the revolutions 
appeared to be the only way to destroy these institutions.  
As already pointed, revolutions of the modern type occur at a certain 
stage when development becomes impeded by rigid obstacles and institu-
tions. And these may include not only absolute monarchy, aristocracy  
or large feudal landholding but also rigid institutions of exploitation. 
Moreover, if the exploited class grows rapidly in quantitative and qualita-
tive terms as it was with the working class in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, it is clear that the proletariat's struggle for rights and guarantees 
might become a part of revolutionary movement and at certain stages 
even its major constituent (as it happened in July 1848 and in 1871 in Par-
is). Only the adoption of relevant legislation and establishment of a more 
flexible system allowed eliminating the threat of proletarian revolution. 
To a greater extent this also refers to growing national self-consciousness 
of the peoples deprived of statehood and lacking at least autonomy. Na-
tional oppression and the legislation fixing inequality of peoples, lan-
guages, national religions, etc., form strict relations which can be hardly 
changed (moreover, the state's purposeful policy can strengthen them). 
Thus, nationalist revolutions as a means to change situation are quite 
characteristic of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (see Gellner 
1983). Revolutions in the Austrian Empire in 1848–1849 and 1918–1919 
were in many respects caused by dissatisfaction with national relations. 
Even in Britain which seemed to have gone through the revolutionary 
stage, a revolution (revolt) would break out in Ireland in 1916 precisely 
because of the failed resolution of the Irish self-determination problem.  
Thus, revolutions generally provide an opportunity to forcibly 
change the situation when certain forces (along with their self-conscious-
ness) grow in the presence of rigid institutions and relations (also includ-
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ing the consciousness of the authorities and protecting them elites), which 
hinder the further growth and self-determination of those forces. Revolu-
tionary conflicts may break out in different spheres including political, 
national, social and even religious ones.  
Revolution as a means of mutual influence between societies and the 
World System  
Revolutions cannot be explained only within the systemic-approach 
framework via the analysis of a society as a self-sustaining system. One 
needs a different approach like the world-system one. Many studies show 
the importance of accounting the international factor for the understand-
ing both of the causes of revolutions and their success/failure (in theoreti-
cal terms and with respect to certain revolutions) (e.g., Skocpol 1979; 
Skocpol and Trimberger 1994; Wickham-Crowley 1992; Halliday 1999; 
Snyder 1999; Pastor 2001; Goldstone 1986, 2001, 2014, etc.; see also 
Sanderson 2005). We also find quite challenging the idea about a permis-
sive or favorable global context for revolutions (e.g., Goldfrank 1979; 
Goodwin and Skopol 1989; Wickham-Crowley 1992). Many researches 
deal with ideological impact of foreign ideas and movements, as well  
as when the content of revolutionary movements in one nation influences 
others (Arjomand 1992; Colburn 1994; Katz 1997; Halliday 1999; see 
also Johnson 1993; Katz 1997; Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000).9 
Nevertheless, in our opinion, there are few full-scale studies of the 
impact of the world-system factor on different aspects of revolutions and 
revolutionary waves.  
Along with wars, long cycles of political hegemony and other phenom-
ena, revolutions can be treated as a means of the World-system's impact on 
particular societies and vice versa as a means of transformation or even re-
configuration of the World System itself and transition to a new world order.  
Let us apply the World-System approach to define some peculiarities 
of revolutions in the countries of the World System semi-periphery and 
periphery. The matter is that the revolutionary impact penetrating from 
the more developed countries of the World System to its less developed 
ones, can make the revolutionary traits considerably vary in the developed 
and less developed countries. 
Besides, by the time when revolutions started in the World-System 
semi-peripheral and peripheral countries, that is by the early twentieth 
century, revolutions in a number of advanced societies seem to be an out-
dated means of social development and conflict resolution and they were 
replaced by more civilized forms (see below).10 Thus, the World System 
core tried to advance via various smoother ways. However, in the twenti-
eth century a great number of revolutions broke out far from the core: in 
the semi-periphery and periphery (see Grinin 2018b; see also Sanderson 
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2016: 74–77). Thus, for the semi-peripheral and peripheral countries that 
strive to catch up the advanced ones, revolutions start to be a pusher, yet, 
the characteristics of revolutions could considerable vary along with the 
opportunities they provided to draw a revolutionary society to a more 
advanced developmental trajectory. That is why in many societies revolu-
tions preserved their relevance. This primarily refers to those societies 
that grew to the level when revolutions became generally possible while 
the political system did not keep up with the times. As a result these quickly 
developing countries experienced a revolutionary collapse (as it happened 
in China). This also fully refers to national-liberation revolutions which 
mostly occurred when semi-peripheral and peripheral countries developed 
to the level to claim their sovereignty.  
In fact, the transition to a required persistent development (as well  
as to the idea of indispensable modernization) would hardly spread in 
many societies, were it not for the international military and political ri-
valry and economic superiority of other countries as its inevitable conse-
quence. Since the military capabilities depended on technologies (gunpow-
der revolutions, shipping, routes of communication, infrastructure, etc.),  
the need for military and economic modernization became a dire necessity. 
The financial costs of such military modernization forced to search for re-
sources in the development of trade and industry, improvement of education, 
etc. Hence, the role of the external factor became crucial. Other achieve-
ments, including in medical, scientific spheres, etc. should be also borrowed.  
In the first case, modernization needed to borrow knowledge and edu-
cation system, which together could trigger cultural borrowings as well. 
However, the cultural borrowings would sooner or later lead to import  
of revolutionary ideologies. As a result, in the catching-up countries they 
started to consider the Western-model revolutions (similar to democracy af-
terward) as a certain universal and progressive means to achieve a new level. 
The World System's structure affects different countries in various 
ways depending on their functional position. The penetration of new ideo-
logies to dependent countries also creates some new situations there. Be-
sides since development constantly proceeded in all societies, yet being 
more intensive in the World-System core, there is an evident aspiration  
of societies lagging behind the core to catch up with it (yet only few  
of them would finally succeed). However, this race creates prerequisites for 
recurrent revolutions in catching up countries, especially if the latter fail to 
establish institutions capable of peaceful transformation of the society. 
The emerging gap between ideologies and opportunities of a particu-
lar society increases tension and revolutionary sentiments. Finally, this 
may lead to a kind of frustration and evaluation of one's own political 
regime and relations as backward, useless and demanding a breakup; and 
consequently, this raises tensions and revolutionary sentiments caused  
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by propaganda. There is also an international, albeit small, but active so-
cial group of revolutionary ideologists. The ongoing modernization rein-
forces the impact of new ideologies in these societies. Hence there emerge 
revolutionary internationalism and universal revolutionary ideology. 
In other words, revolutions quite often occur in societies that hardly ob-
jectively achieve the level when revolutions become inevitable; but since 
certain social groups are formed due to revolutionary ideologies and practic-
es borrowed from more advanced societies, the social protests and discontent 
are canalized in an objectively higher social form than they should be. 
In brief, the world-system effect allows revolutions to engage periph-
eral countries which are not objectively ready for such pattern of ad-
vancement. The situation seems similar to the one when economic crisis 
are transmitted to industrial economies of peripheral countries while the 
latter are still too weak and would hardly reach the crisis level on their 
own. Thus, revolutions may occur in societies with weak or absolutely ab-
sent social basis for their outbreak. And in the course or after revolution such 
societies may be thrown back since the attempts to introduce the new-level 
relations fail and the relations inherent for these societies are somehow re-
stored (which can be manifested in decentralization, bloody dictatorships 
and modification of archaic relations). In our opinion, many revolutions in 
the East and other peripheral regions starting from the early twentieth centu-
ry as well as many communist revolutions can be attributed to this type. 
Thus, it appears that since ideologies can be borrowed (or deliberate-
ly imposed from outside with the purpose of preparing revolution) there 
emerge revolutionary internationalism and revolutionary ideology which 
become universal for the World System or its parts. 
The wider revolutions spread in the periphery the stronger is their de-
structive effect and negative consequences.  
And one more important remark. If there emerge centers of revolu-
tionary transformations that consider revolutions in other countries to be 
their most important objective, the possibilities of revolutionary outbreaks 
and their success significantly increase. In many respects this is the result of 
implementation of specific technologies which take into account preparation 
of revolutionaries, etc. The USSR remained such a center for a long time, 
and in recent decades the USA have become a center of the so-called ‘color 
revolutions’ (certainly there also existed and exist smaller centers, e.g., those 
inspiring Islamic revolutions). Besides, the dominating revolutionary ideolo-
gies along with propaganda proclaiming revolutions fair and progressive 
substantially weaken the authorities' and regimes' efficiency to resist them. 
We must also add that in the recent two decades the constant pressure 
of the part of the core that demands democratic changes provides strong 
pressure on the ruling elite in these countries and a powerful support for 
those forces seeking for forcible changes. Thus, we observe a new wave  
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of revolutions (in the early twenty-first century) caused by the fact that the 
core societies stimulate the semi-peripheral societies' transformations. 
Thus, the world-system effect enlarges the scope of revolutions in the 
world and involves societies that are immature or not fully prepared for 
revolutions, and increases the chances of their success. To a certain ex-
tent, it is just the world-system effect that makes revolutions remain the 
means of social transformations. 
THE CHANGING ROLE OF REVOLUIONS IN HISTORICAL 
PROCESS  
In this section we will try to combine considerations of revolutions within 
two approaches, namely, of historical process and the World-System one.  
The role of revolutions prior to the Modern Era  
A society, especially the modernizing one, is a self-developing system 
which is destined to go through crises from time to time. One should note 
that these crises result from a long-term growth. Therefore, crises emerge 
in any societies experiencing a rapid growth. But the manifestations of crises 
can vary. For example, in the early medieval period the rapid economic and 
socio-cultural development of territories of barbarian kingdoms led to the 
decentralization crisis of archaic monarchy, while a rapid territorial growth 
of the Roman Republic led to civil war and change of political regime.  
In the millennial history there were many cases of state crisis associ-
ated with different factors (Eisenstadt 1978; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; 
Grinin 2010, 2011a, 2012c). Respectively, one can observe greatly vary-
ing sorts of crisis and resolution of contradictions in societies prior to the 
Modern era, including revolts and rebellions, plots and coups d'état, ex-
ternal and civil wars, repressions and deportations, relocations and colo-
nies exit and many others. As already said, revolutions may be also at-
tributed to this list but mainly in a definite type of societies and in general 
they were far a less frequent form in comparison with others. Among the 
transforming means to solve objective tasks of strengthening and devel-
opment of a society the reforms and large activities (like a construction  
of irrigation facilities) are most often applied. Also there were conducted 
measures to unify the management of the conquered lands (this was the 
case with emerging large empires). They were usually performed by a state 
under the initiative and guidance of vigorous politicians. Not only in mo-
narchies and tyrannies, but often in republics as well such reforms were 
conducted by rather violent means. Sometimes one observes reformers 
(like Solon in Athens) who created new legal or other systems. There 
were also religious reformers (like Akhenaten in Egypt or Ashoka in In-
dia). In historical process revolutions were just as an additional means  
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of societal development and could hardly push a society to a new devel-
opmental stage. 
The role of revolutions in the Modern era prior to the mid-nineteenth 
century. The changing role of revolutions for the World System core  
Revolutions are a tool to change society and its political and social order. 
The main difference between political crises and anti-governmental ac-
tions of the early modern period and the revolts in the late-agrarian socie-
ties consists in the aspiration to spread the action nationwide, to give it  
a prominent ideological character, and the most vivid difference is the 
goal to substitute the existing regime for a new public authority of nation-
al scale. Herewith, the upper urban strata, including the counter-elite and 
some of the elite ousted from power, form the core and the primary force 
of such a movement. But all these strata are united by a new ideology.  
Until the mid-nineteenth century, revolutions occurred primarily  
in the countries advanced in terms of a new production principle, that  
is with developing early industrialization and capitalist entrepreneurship 
(see Grinin L. and Grinin A. 2015, 2016; Grinin and Korotayev 2015). 
Here one can name early sixteenth-century Germany, the Netherlands in 
the late sixteenth century, and England in the seventeenth century. Thus, 
these early revolutions, especially in the Netherland and Britain, opened new 
paths and huge perspectives both for these countries and for other European 
countries and their colonies, including the American colonies. As for the 
Reformation, based on the early urbanized and early bourgeois societies, 
in a number of the European countries it opened the way to strengthen 
and institutionalize that ‘spirit of capitalism’ which Max Weber (1930 
[1904]) spoke about. 
It is worth noting that revolutions in this period (especially in the 
seventeenth century) were a rare case, actually an exception. The main 
forms of protests, along with peaceful and legal actions, were revolts and 
insurrections. The leading forms of societal transformations were reforms 
and forced transformations caused by the efforts to enhance the military 
and financial situation in a state and also to strengthen the estates' rights. 
The main forms of political transformations were conspiracies, coups 
d'état, small and large civil wars and also external wars which seemed 
almost endless. But the role of occasional revolutions in opening the new 
paths for advancement and for the World System increased immensely. 
Besides, the revolutions considerable changed the balance of power 
in the World System. So when Fernand Braudel (1985) and Giovanni 
Arrighi (1994) speak about the change of leaders during of long cycles  
of capital accumulation and hegemonic transitions of the Modern era  
(in particular, about the transition from the Genoese to the Dutch cycle  
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of Accumulation and later to the British one) then the roots of this transi-
tion originated to the consequences of these revolutions. 
In the late eighteenth century there occurred two large revolutions: 
the American and French. While the American Revolution can undoubt-
edly be considered as a powerful drive of advance, the progressive role 
of the French revolution immediately became the matter of fierce debates. 
In the mid-nineteenth century this was already pointed by Alexis de Tocque-
ville who analyzed the ‘old’ regime, that is, the pre-revolutionary (prior  
to 1789) one in France. He concluded that ‘the Revolution effected sud-
denly, by a convulsive and sudden effort, without transition, precautions, 
or pity, what would have been gradually affected by time had it never 
occurred’ (Tocqueville 2010 [1856]: 36–37).  
But this referred only to the development of France. The French 
Revolution despite all its high costs (including millions of lives lost dur-
ing the Napoleonic wars) undoubtedly gave a significant impetus to trans-
formations not only in France but also in Europe and in the whole world. 
As we pointed elsewhere (Grinin 2017a, 2017b, 2018a) great revolutions 
may divert and even throw back the society that generated them, and still 
they realize the aspirations for certain changes, transformations and needs 
(although this is conducted in a distorted ideological way). Meanwhile, the 
neighboring societies can benefit from such development since they can 
conduct appropriate changes under the influence of revolutionary events.  
In other words, it is a way to implement the historical process in which some 
societies' progress can be achieved at the expense of the others' failure.  
The revolutions of the 1830s and 1848–1849 in Europe expanded de-
velopmental opportunities for national states and opened a wide path for 
the European democracy and completion of industrialization in many Eu-
ropean states. 
One may draw a conclusion that revolutions of the late eighteenth and 
first half of the nineteenth century occurred not in the economically leading 
countries but in those that were just close to the most developed countries. As 
a result, the role of revolutions in the nineteenth century changed in a way.11 
Although they still preserved a significant progressive meaning, they failed  
to open any different developmental ways but instead would create alterna-
tives (as in the USA and Germany) and extended the World-System core. 12 
The Declining progressive role of revolutions in the World-System 
core and their substitution for reforms 
In the period following the revolutions of 1848–1849 there were quite  
a few revolutions in Europe. The revolutionary epoch in Spain and France 
was still on the way and also the Civil War continued in the USA. But 
there was nothing similar to the wave of 1848–1849 until the start of the 
revolutionary wave associated with World War I (below we will show 
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that in terms of historical process the character of those revolutions was 
already different). However, the European countries developed rather 
rapidly also in terms of expanding freedoms and improving quality of life. 
This was connected in many ways with the fact that revolutionary exper-
iments obviously cost too much and the revolutionary ‘bitter pill’ turned 
out to be too strong and dangerous. So the societies that had experienced 
revolutions and had burning memories were eager to conduct preventive 
reforms. This contributed to the historical lessons learned by the elites 
and states along with their developed sense of self-preservation, and new 
institutions established as a result of previous fights and development (in 
particular, local governments, constitutional monarchies, parliaments, 
new proceedings, the system of political parties and professional associa-
tions). Conscious reforming which if successful could reduce social ten-
sion, and what is more important, open horizons for society's develop-
ment for decades. Reforms could also come at a price but still they turn 
far less costly than revolutions. All these led to the fact that in a number 
of societies revolutions became an outdated means of social transfor-
mations.13 Gradually and far from easily did they become associated with 
a definite historical stage of societal development. But this occurred only 
in some societies, which had recovered from revolutions and approached 
the leading societies (the World System core including the English do-
minions like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). 
On the one hand, this has generally decreased the role of revolutions 
as driving forces of historical process in the World-System framework 
since its core would now advance via different and smoother ways.  
 
The increasing role of revolutions in the World-System semi-periphery 
and periphery. Revolutions as a result of the World System's trans-
formations in the first half of the twentieth century  
Thus, the World-System's most developed countries diverged from revolu-
tions to the advantage of preventive reforms. However, in certain circum-
stances, revolutions still remained relevant. This primarily refers to those 
societies that achieved the level when revolutions became possible, yet their 
political system did not change in tune with the epoch. This means, that 
societies start to develop quicker in certain spheres (especially in produc-
tion, communication means and transport, culture, and demography) than 
their social-political structures allow. The more explosive is development 
and growth the more severe appears the crisis caused by such development.  
If we consider the general range of revolutions starting from the 
Modern period, it becomes clear that such events are associated with  
a definite stage of societal development. Revolutions can hardly occur in 
the society at any period of its history (Huntington 1968). Thus, a society 
should come up to a revolution. 
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However, the success of a revolution in terms of its further progres-
sive role largely depends on the correlation between a society's actual 
readiness to transformations which are proclaimed as the goals of revolu-
tion and these goals as such. The large discrepancies between revolution-
ary slogans and actual opportunities can be revealed in any revolution.14 
But the more the revolutionary slogans and ideas are borrowed from the 
outside, the less understandable is the meaning of revolutionary ideas for 
social forces and the larger is the defined gap. Also the more the revolu-
tionary objectives diverge with a society’s readiness to follow them the 
stronger is the possibility that the progressive outcomes of the revolution 
would be minimal or negative. This especially refers to democratic ideals 
in the societies lacking respective experience. That is why it is the possi-
ble introduction of a stable democracy that revolutions often fail to ac-
complish. Meanwhile, the national-liberal struggle and endeavors to es-
tablish an independent state more often succeed with revolutions. The 
communist ideals fail during revolutions in the countries where private 
property relations and religion are strong (as it occurred in Afghanistan 
after 1978); on the contrary, the communist relations can be established in 
the societies where the private property positions are weak with a strong 
role of a state. The society's unpreparedness to realize revolutionary goals 
may help explain why the progressive role of revolutions in the World-
System semi-periphery and periphery considerably declined in compari-
son with its role in the world-system core in the previous periods. 
The societies of the World-System near and far semi-periphery were 
getting mature during the second half of the nineteenth century (and special-
ly the last third) which as we already told, was of less revolutionary charac-
ter than its first half. But when those semi-periphery societies rose in eco-
nomic, political and cultural terms, the revolution became there a powerful 
alternative to reforms. And with account that their elite was insufficiently 
ready for a revolutionary rise while their intelligentsia took the model from 
the European countries, a number of countries were captured with revolu-
tions in the early twentieth century. So the first revolutionary wave of the 
twentieth century started to involve Russia, Turkey, Persia, China and Mexico. 
Yet, one should note that social systems in these countries did not in-
trinsically come up to the level when revolutions may appear an efficient 
and, what is more important, final resolution of internal problems. Under 
previous regimes they had hardly exhausted their reform resources. As  
a result, these rapidly developing societies experienced a revolutionary 
collapse, often accompanied with the split of the state and an epoch of se-
vere internal conflicts (the most vivid example here is China). This was 
exacerbated by the revolutionaries' ultimate goal of creating a democratic 
society which these countries were not ready for. 
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The role of these revolutions in historical terms was associated with 
dragging semi-periphery and a part of periphery to the World-System core 
and search for new developmental paths (among which communism would 
later show up). But this catching up was rather rigorous. So the revolutions 
appeared devastating and leading to civil wars and severe hardships. 
The First World War opened a very hard period of the World-System 
transformation (and change of its leader) which mostly completed only by 
the mid-twentieth century. To a certain extent the revolutions of 1917–
1923 and following events could be considered as related to those World-
System transformations. During the same period many revolutions took 
place and also other events that were equal to revolutions in their signifi-
cance and were connected with military turnovers, dictatorships, peaceful 
but very profound and violent changes in different countries including 
those close to the World-System core or those constituting this core 
(Germany, Austria, and Italy). These changes far from always proceeded 
as revolutions so we consider them as analogues of revolutions (here we 
attribute the Nazis seizure of power in Germany and the changes conduct-
ed in the country and neighboring states). 
After their completion, many revolutions of the 1900–1930s (with  
a few exception including Mexico15) generally failed to become a means 
of progress which could be considered as an evident advantage over the 
previous development. This does not mean that they had not any positive 
impact, but the cost was too high. And the transition of Germany to the 
right-wing national-socialist revolution had huge negative consequences. 
Revolutions of the second half of the twentieth century and early 
twenty-first century 
Revolutions of the 1940–1970s had two major aspects. First, these were 
revolutions of the remoted periphery and opened the way to the emergence 
of new states in Asia, Africa and others regions. These countries' further 
development proceeded mostly far from smoothly. However, with the 
emergence of new states in the 1940–1970s the number of military coups 
in the world increased by ten folds which became for many countries the 
main form of changing policy and regimes. Just a small number of these 
turnovers can be considered as analogues of revolutions.  
Let us also point that countries that became independent as a result  
of severe wars with metropoles got no evident advantages in comparison 
with the countries that obtained independence after agreements with 
metropoles or which the latter set free of their own free will. 
The second aspect was connected with the struggle between super-
powers (the USA and the USSR) for the global leadership and respective-
ly and associated communist revolutions and anti-communist actions (like 
military turnovers or civil wars). Let us note that communist revolutions, 
especially in Europe, mostly exhausted their progressive potential and their 
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ideas mainly effected the mitigation of social policy in other countries. This 
was also connected with the fact that such revolutions became a geopolitical 
weapon which mostly solved not national tasks but served the interests of 
the communist superpowers (the USSR and Maoist China). 
Thus, numerous revolutions and their analogues in the 1940–1970s 
undoubtedly considerably contributed to the change of the World-
System's near and far semi-periphery and periphery and promoted the 
emergence of a new state. But on the whole, the progressive potential of 
revolutions was rather limited and can be hardly compared with the role 
of revolutions in the seventeenth – nineteenth century. 
The wave of anti-communist revolutions brought a number of East 
European countries back to the developmental mainstream. Their ad-
vantage consisted in the fact that most of them were ‘velvet’ and blood-
less. Concerning the revolutionary waves of the twenty-first century, they 
included revolutions which were mostly used as a geopolitical weapon 
and served the interests of superpowers and not of the societies. And this 
considerably undermines their progressive potential. And in those cases 
when they were mostly caused by internal problems, as it was in Egypt, 
still they did not show up their advantage in comparison with moderniza-
tion imposed by the authoritarian regimes. On the contrary, most of the 
contemporary revolutions can hardly be considered as a progressive impe-
tus (Ukraine, Egypt, Tunisia are vivid examples here), besides they do 
cause international crises (as in Ukraine, Syria, and Yemen). Quite often 
revolutions provoke a return to the former authoritarian model and as a 
result almost everything returns to the state as it was before revolution (as 
in Egypt after the military takeover in July 2013). Moreover, the pro-
spects of success of a revolution (again in terms of improving life and 
especially in eliminating the roots that cause it) are not guaranteed and 
sometimes are very modest, indeed. And we should repeat again, there  
is a high probability that everything will be back in its place. 
We have already compared the cost of revolutions and reforms. Now 
the balance has considerably shifted in favor of the latter. That is why today 
one can hardly estimate numerous revolutions (especially in societies which 
are not ready for democracy) in positive terms since their value and espe-
cially the risk of bringing a society to a wrong path (as it happened in 1979 
in Iran) significantly exceeds potential progress. In other words, the same 
results (i.e., the improvement of the quality of life and modernization of 
society) can eventually be achieved at a more peaceful pace, albeit at the 
cost of preserving an immoral regime but without social upheavals. 
Thus, we can make a conclusion that in the course of historical pro-
cess the role of revolutions as a means of advancing societies and the 
World System and as a driving force of progress opening new develop-
mental perspectives has changed. It increased starting from the sixteenth 
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century, reached its apogee in the seventeenth century, remained high 
over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and then its role as a driver 
of the World-System progress generally began to decline; yet, its role as  
a means of the World-System transformation increased. In recent dec-
ades, the role of revolutions as a geopolitical weapon to increase the su-
perpowers' influence has considerably increased. 
CONCLUSION. THE ROLE OF REVOLUTIONS IN THE  
FURTURE 
An important point related to the world-historical aspect of the impact of 
great revolutions is the emergence of new trajectories of historical devel-
opment. The emergence of a new developmental trajectory provides new 
opportunities and increases competition along with simultaneous diver-
gence and convergence. However, in this respect the role of revolutions  
in historical process decreases and after the 1940s there have hardly oc-
curred any great or just large-scale revolutions that could change the 
global developmental trajectory. And this is good indeed since great revo-
lutions bring great upheavals and sacrifices while the same transfor-
mations can be achieved by more balanced means. 
Therefore, we notice the changing role of revolutions as a means of so-
cial advance in historical process. They used to be the means of social and 
political transformations that opened new horizons for historical process in 
general, but today they have become a geopolitical means of increasing 
impact of certain forces and regimes or of imposing certain political forms. 
Moreover, instead of the means to generate modernization the revolutions 
turned the upheavals bringing societies to stagnation and degradation.   
With respect to the subject of the present volume, one can hardly ar-
gue that the decreasing role of revolutions in historical process (as paving 
the way for new levels and trajectories) as a trend observed over several 
decades of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries will certainly continue.  
However, their importance for the World-System, as we pointed 
above, remains rather significant. Speaking about the future of revolutions 
it seems obviously that 
1) Revolutions as a means of modernization will still play their part 
in currently underdeveloped countries but this role will decrease due to 
the world community’s impact and accumulation of historical experience 
as well as due to the development of alternative modernization patterns. 
2) Revolutions as a means of democratization of authoritarian socie-
ties and non-consolidated democracy. Revolutions may generate new de-
velopmental alternatives within individual societies. But it is important 
that chances that such new alternatives will be better than the development 
within the authoritarian mode are quite modest. 
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It is more important for the prediction that there are at least two ma-
jor alternative scenarios of the possible role of revolutions in future.  
First. Revolutions will hardly disappear, but their significance in terms 
of advancement will decrease even more. However, in future they may be 
quite numerous and engage influential nations and this in any case will 
strongly affect the destiny of many countries. Such revolutions appear an 
important factor of the World System's reconfiguration (see Grinin 2012b, 
2018b; Grinin and Korotayev 2016a). 
Moreover, in this case revolutions will be a kind of a ram destroying 
the old world-system/global order and preparing the ground for the estab-
lishment of a new world order. Second. The revolutions will not disap-
pear, but their significance with respect to advancement seems doubtful. 
Most revolutions will probably take the existing patterns of ‘color revolu-
tions’ or violent upheavals. But some may still produce considerable im-
pacts on the World System and its large parts and consequently, on the 
global history. Since we expect a drastic transformation of the world or-
der within the next decades it seems reasonable to suppose that this new 
order will be established via different means including revolutions. That 
is why the importance of revolutions as tools of progress may increase, 
especially if they occur in the USA or other Western countries (this be-
comes quite possible if the situation in the world changes dramatically). 
Moreover, revolutions in great powers like Russia and especially China 
will also strongly affect the World System and the future world order. 
NOTES 
* This article is an output of a research project implemented as a part of the Basic 
Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics 
(HSE) in 2019 with support by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (Project No. 
17-06-00464). 
1 About an unstable equilibrium resulting from a number of serious challenges in 
a society see Goldstone 2014. Many researchers also analyzed societies as systems 
whose adequate functioning depended on the maintained equilibrium of interchange of 
matter, energy and information between the system and its environment, as well as 
between subsystems constituting a system. Within this approach, researchers not with-
out reason argued that any critical disturbance destroying this equilibrium leads a soci-
ety to a state of imbalance (Hagopian 1974) or dysfunction (Johnson 1968), which 
brings a serious risk of revolutionary destabilization. Besides, within this approach 
there were proposed a number of ‘candidates’ that can become the forces leading social 
systems to dysfunction/destabilization, for example: an uneven impact of technological 
growth and modernization processes on the needs of different subsystems in resources 
and on their actual supply with these resources, changes in distribution of power be-
tween the elites of different subsystems (Jessop 1972), violent changes in value sys-
tems resulting from the emergence of new religions or ideologies (Johnson 1968) or 
just asynchrony of the changes in different subsystems (Hagopian 1974). 
2 For example, the reforms conducted in the fourteenth-century B.C. by Uruin-
imgina who was probably elected the ruler of Lagash after the popular uprising (Dya-
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konov 1951; 1983: 207–274; 2000: 55–56); about similar uprisings and the establish-
ment of a peculiar form of government see also Shtyrbul 2006. 
3 Among the Chinese popular uprisings the Taiping Rebellion of 1850−1864 is 
the most similar to revolution (see, e.g., Ilyushechkin 1967). 
4 Of course, we can denote it as a progressive development only in the final ac-
count (since revolutions proved to be a rather costly way of development and some-
times would temporarily throw society back). Moreover, we denote them in such a way 
also referring to the period up to the end of the nineteenth century (see below). 
5 However, as we will see below, in the twentieth century due to the changing his-
torical role of revolutions, the latter could bring a society to the non-mainstream path 
of development. Such paths were communism and fascism; the religious revolution in 
Iran can also be referred here. 
6 Except for such revolutions as the plebian movements in ancient Rome. 
7 Of most importance was the Mohamed revolution in the early seventh century AD. 
8 The concept of modernization covers a wide range of subjects and its exact def-
inition is disputable (Black 1966; Rostow 1971; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; 
Poberezhnikov 2006; Travin and Margania 2004; Grinin 2012c). About the connection 
between revolution and modernization see, e.g., Huntington 1968; Hobsbawm 1996; 
Boix 2011; Grinin 2013, 2017a, 2018b. 
9 Note that the third-generation revolutionary theorists (following Goldstone's 
terminology [2014]) started to pay great attention to the impact of external factors 
(especially wars) as triggers of revolutionary destabilization. Meanwhile, the fourth-
generation revolutionary theorists put particular emphasis on the long-term impact of 
external factors (when, e.g., military rivalry could force a state to actively extract re-
sources from social system). By the way, this is the case of the exhausted USSR. 
10 We do not consider here the nineteenth century revolutions in Latin America. 
But still we should note that since it was the World-System periphery the revolutions 
did not and could not lead to there any stable progressive outcome. 
11 To which we may also attribute the Meiji revolution in Japan in 1868. 
12 For example, in the USA industrialization with a high level of machines pro-
ceeded until the mid-nineteenth century and mostly relied not on the steam but on 
water energy which was abundant in the North America (see Grinin 2007; Grinin L. 
and Grinin A. 2015; Grinin and Korotayev 2015). 
13 This conviction started to widely spread after the Great French Revolution. Start-
ing form the second half of the nineteenth century it became a dominant idea in social 
philosophy especially after the spread of Herbert Spencer's evolutionary ideas (2000 
[1862]; 1872). In the twentieth century this almost became a postulate in academic social 
studies (e.g., Le Bon 1913; Adams 1913; Sorokin 1925; Edwards 1927; Pettee 1938; 
Brinton 1965 [1938]; Brogan 1952: 96; Carr 1955: 710; Wolfe 1965: 7; Berger and Neu-
haus 1970: 53; Dunn 1972: 11–12; Boulding 1953: xiv; Ellul 1971: 39, 43).  
14 In order to accomplish the goals set by a revolution there is often needed not 
one but two or more revolutions and often a whole revolutionary epoch during which 
both the goals and the society's mindset are modified.  
15 By the way, this happened in many ways due to the fact that this was hardly the 
first revolution in this country and besides, they had a certain experience of democracy.  
16 The divergence/convergence cycles (see Grinin and Korotayev 2016a). 
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